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Keynote Address
The Changing Role 
of Banking Supervision
ood afternoon. My remarks today on the occasion of this
 timely conference will focus on the major developments 
occurring in the European financial sector. Specifically, I will 
offer my thoughts on how these developments are affecting the 
banking structure in Europe. And, perhaps most importantly, 
I will reflect on the implications of these financial system 
changes for the supervision of financial institutions.
Trends in the European 
Financial Sector
The European financial sector has been experiencing several 
major developments: deregulation, the introduction of the 
euro, the internationalization of the financial markets, 
disintermediation, and rapid technological change. I would 
like to speak on a few of these issues.
I will begin with deregulation. Compared with the regulated 
European financial systems of the postwar period, most 
European countries have been liberalizing their financial 
services sectors. This trend began in the mid-1960s and 
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, European 
countries have progressively opened their financial markets to 
foreign competition. These actions came about through 
independent national legislation as well as from the dynamics 
of the Treaty of Rome, which received a renewed impetus from 
the single market program. Furthermore, the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive—implemented on January 1, 1993—
introduced the single banking license, which allows credit 
institutions to establish branches or to supply cross-border 
services to all European Economic Area countries without 
prior approval from the authorities of a particular country. 
The European Union is aiming for a fully liberalized European 
market for financial services by the year 2005.
On the surface, this open legislative environment looks 
good, but in practice it has been frustrated by infrastructural 
impediments, which are still prevalent in some countries. 
Notably, government ownership has prevented liberalization 
for a long time, although over the past few years there has 
clearly been improvement, especially in southern European 
countries such as Spain and Italy. In Germany, however, the 
local government’s ownership of savings banks and so-called 
länderbanken still stands in the way of a more market-oriented 
development.
Disintermediation, too, has had an impact on the European 
financial sector. The introduction of the euro has stimulated 
the internationalization of the capital markets, thereby making 
these markets deeper, more transparent, and more liquid than 
the previously existing national capital markets. It has forced 
banks to reassess their position in the market. In most 
institutions, including mine, net income from interest has 
declined, reflecting the shift from the role of traditional credit 
intermediary to that of fee-based income generator. It will be 
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interesting to see whether the Capital Accord redesign affects 
this development.
Another development—technological change—has been 
present in the European financial sector since the 1960s and 
1970s. At that time, banks began to reduce the costs of their 
information processing capabilities by replacing paper- and 
labor-intensive operations with computers. However, the 
impact of computerization is small compared with the impact 
of network technology. For example, the interlinking of real-
time gross settlement systems through the European TARGET 
system has greatly stimulated the development of a single 
European money market. But the mark made by network 
technology will be even more profound because the Internet 
will alter the ground rules of our economy, as the classic trade-
off between richness of information and reach of information 
will end, and communications costs will decrease and 
eventually disappear.
U.S. companies, supported by a more flexible labor market, 
have been able to adapt their organizations and strategies to 
these technological changes more effectively than European 
companies. As a result, the U.S. Internet penetration rate 
currently is 60 percent, compared with the European Union’s 
rate of just 14 percent. In addition, the United States accounted 
for 67 percent of the total volume of electronic commerce in 
1999, compared with 17 percent for the European Union. The 
characteristics of the new economy—such as high job growth 
combined with low inflation—are not yet as visible in Europe, 
where unemployment is still as high as 9 percent, although it is 
decreasing rapidly.
Nevertheless, the size of the European Union market—
which, in terms of number of consumers, is larger than the U.S. 
market—is creating major opportunities. The European Union 
will soon close the gap with the United States by further 
integrating and liberalizing the internal market. The 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector, for example, 
should contribute to a greater reduction in telecommuni-
cations costs, thereby encouraging the broader public to use 
the Internet. Moreover, the development of a single legal 
framework for security, privacy, tax, and intellectual property 
issues will also help to integrate the internal market.
Changes in the European 
Banking Structure
How, then, have these developments affected the European 
banking structure? The introduction of the euro, for example, 
has stimulated the evolution of an integrated internal 
European market for financial services, which is lowering entry 
barriers and forcing European banks to redefine their 
traditional, national home-market positions. Consequently, 
mergers, acquisitions, and alliances could and should be taking 
place, because banks are being compelled to defend their 
traditional home-market positions while they strengthen their 
positions in the much larger European market. 
Thus far, however, the recent wave of consolidation has 
taken place mainly within national boundaries, and in some 
countries it is still in its initial phase. In Germany, this 
phenomenon is due primarily to state- and local-government-
owned retail banks, while in Italy, the privatizations have yet to 
lead to consolidation. And no doubt you are all aware of the 
failed attempt to create a national champion in France. In fact, 
there are only a few small European countries, such as Benelux 
and the Scandinavian countries, and one large country, Spain, 
where in-country consolidation has occurred. 
Similarly, cross-border consolidation, in my opinion, is still 
at an early stage. National interests have created a high barrier 
to this type of consolidation, as local governments have 
emphasized the development of national champions that can 
compete on a European and global scale. And let us not forget 
the major legislative and governance problems involved. 
Furthermore, one cannot expect that the banking sectors in 
countries such as France, Germany, or Italy will be as 
concentrated as the banking sector in a small country like the 
Netherlands, where the top three banks account for 80 percent 
of the retail market share. The domestic markets in France, 
Germany, and Italy are much bigger, and therefore offer room 
for a greater number of viable banks. 
In terms of technological developments, they have already 
started to have an effect on branch networks, albeit to a varying 
extent in different European Union countries. A good example 
is Internet banking, which reduces the need for an extensive 
brick-and-mortar branch network. In fact, as part of its 
multichannel distribution strategy, ABN AMRO has decided to 
reduce the number of branches in the Netherlands, and plans 
further reductions. 
Apart from reducing the size of brick-and-mortar branch 
networks, it is still not completely clear how the Internet will 
affect the financial system in Europe. One possible scenario is 
that vertically integrated institutions will lose their raison 
d´être, as transaction costs between functional units of the 
same organization dwindle. As a result, it might be more 
efficient to outsource certain activities and focus on particular 
aspects of the previously integrated value chain. Some believe 
that, through the unbundling of the value chain, specialization 
will become the dominant business model in banking and 
financial services because it enables institutions to provide the 
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However, there currently is not much evidence that this 
development will take place. In my opinion, the chance that a 
virtual bank will ever be in a position to take over the role of a 
traditional retail bank fully is very small, if not nonexistent. 
I believe in the concept of retail clients being in a position to 
choose from several distribution channels to conduct different 
kinds of transactions with their bank. In this respect, Internet 
banking is just one of those channels, albeit an important one.
Another possible scenario is that in the Internet era, banks 
will run the risk of losing their unique position as financial 
intermediaries. The overabundance of available information 
certainly creates opportunities for new Internet intermediaries. 
By developing financial portals, the largest European banks are 
fighting for this unique position. In this respect, the alliance in 
Spain between BBVA and Telefónica creates added value for 
both organizations, because they can combine their client bases 
while BBVA delivers the content and Telefónica the technology 
for a financial portal. Similar alliances between telecommuni-
cations companies, banks, insurance companies, and 
supermarket chains will surely emerge in Europe in the near 
future.
The Internet’s role in the European financial system will also 
have implications for banks that operate as trusted third parties 
for transactions, or TTPs. TTPs are particularly important for 
business-to-business e-commerce, in which the monetary 
value of the transactions, and thus the risk involved, is the 
largest. Specifically, eight banks—including Chase, Citigroup, 
and ABN AMRO—initiated Identrus last year, which is 
designed to become a network of TTPs through the issuance 
of digital certificates. The goal in three years is to make Identrus 
the largest TTP network worldwide—with more than 300 
connected banks and more than 5,000 connected companies—
to enable internationally accepted, standardized, and secure 
Internet transactions. 
Banking Supervision
With these myriad changes taking place in the financial system, 
how will supervision of the financial services industry adapt? 
I would like to offer some observations on the organization and 
structure of supervision, particularly in the European Union.
First, with the start of European monetary unification, 
oversight of the European Union’s monetary policy has been 
assigned to the European Central Bank. Article 105(5) of the 
Maastricht Treaty states that the Bank’s responsibility with 
respect to banking supervision is to “contribute to the smooth 
conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and the stability of the financial system.” Operational 
supervision—both at the micro and macro levels—is thus left 
to the national bodies of the individual European Union 
member states.
Second, many countries still have separate regulatory bodies 
that supervise different types of financial institutions. The 
Netherlands, for example, distinguishes the central bank—
which is responsible for banking supervision—from the 
insurance board and the securities board. Although the 
objectives of these national regulators are more or less the 
same, supervision by the central bank and the insurance board 
focuses primarily on the stability and soundness of individual 
institutions, while supervision by the securities board is 
directed toward consumer protection. Furthermore, these 
three financial sectors are governed by three different laws, but 
they are based on the same principles of European Union 
legislation, such as the “single license” and “home-country 
control.”
My third observation along these lines is that the differences 
in supervision owing to national differences are worth noting. 
For instance, the universal banking model—the model of the 
largest banks in continental European countries such as the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland—has created 
differences in the structure of supervision in these countries 
vis-à-vis the structure in such Anglo-Saxon countries as the 
United Kingdom and the United States. In countries with 
universal banks, supervision also involves regulation of a 
bank’s securities activities, a practice that is necessary to judge 
an institution’s overall stability. For example, in the 
Netherlands, de Nederlandsche Bank has prudential 
supervision over all financial institutions that can potentially 
cause systemic risk, except for insurance companies. So, 
although the Netherlands has various supervisors for various 
institutions, regulation of the Dutch financial system is not 
entirely sector-specific.
I should note that I do not favor a division between banking 
supervision and monetary policy. In light of the changes under 
way in the financial services industry, one must consider 
whether a country-specific and sector-specific supervisory 
approach can properly safeguard the stability of the financial 
system. Many of the developments in the financial services 
industry, some of which I have just mentioned, have had an 
impact on the effectiveness of current supervisory practices.
Economic integration and the increased interwovenness 
of the financial markets, for example, have heightened the 
complexity of the financial system. Consequently, bank 
vulnerability to developments affecting other market 
participants in other countries and in other financial sectors 
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between market participants and markets, a break in the 
transaction chain at one market participant may have a 
domino effect worldwide. Unfortunately, the financial turmoil 
in Asia and its aftermath in Russia and Brazil provided evidence 
of such an occurrence, as did the subsequent reactions in the 
western capital markets, where the rush for cash led to a sharp 
deterioration of liquidity as well as to the downfall of the Long-
Term Capital Management hedge fund. The Asian crisis in 
particular has shown that, in tandem with the globalization of 
the financial system, systemic risk is also globalizing. 
Other developments affecting supervisory practices are the 
emergence of Internet banks and financial conglomeration. 
Internet banks are not, in practice, bound by national borders. 
Moreover, these institutions, which are also not subject to 
European Union banking legislation, will be able to provide 
services and sell products throughout the Union. The lack of 
national borders will complicate the supervision of Internet 
banks, raising the question of whether a national regulatory 
authority can conduct bank supervision to protect consumers. 
Financial conglomerates are regulated by a multitude of 
home-country supervisors. However, these sector-specific 
authorities in many cases have an insufficient grip on the 
capital position and activities of the holding companies. For 
example, “double leverage” could lead to a distorted view of the 
financial position of the companies’ bank and insurance 
businesses, as the same capital is being counted twice. 
Conglomeration could also provoke moral hazard behavior in 
the form of supervisory arbitrage, as institutions move certain 
activities to parts of the organization that are subject to less 
rigorous supervision.
As the globalization and complexity of the financial system 
increase, cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation among 
supervisory authorities, as well as greater harmonization and 
standardization of regulatory rules, will be essential. 
Accordingly, various sector-specific international groups of 
supervisory and regulatory agencies—such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the Joint Forum on 
Financial Conglomerates, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors, and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions—will play a leading role going 
forward.
I should note that an attempt to enable pan-European 
supervision is provided for in Article 105(6) of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which could give the European Central Bank specific 
supervisory responsibilities. However, although the provision 
would end the functional and geographic separation between 
monetary policy and prudential supervision, it would not end 
the sectoral split in financial services supervision. This is 
because effective lobbying by the insurance industry on the eve 
of the treaty’s signing has led to the exclusion of insurance 
supervisors from the provision. In addition, the provision is 
only a “last-resort” clause, based on the unanimity of the 
European Union member states.
Importantly, I have doubts as to whether the initiatives for 
cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation, of which I 
mentioned only a few, can go far enough and fast enough in 
light of the globalization of the financial system. For example, 
cooperation between independent supervisory bodies could 
result in conflicts of interest as well as overlaps or gaps in 
supervisory practices. Moreover, differences between national 
supervisors in terms of resources, culture, and legal inter-
pretations could place serious roadblocks on the path to 
international harmonization or centralization of supervision. 
And any overlap in supervisory activities will lead to increased 
costs.
Of course, it is reasonable to ask whether further integration 
and centralization of supervision across national borders and 
financial sectors is desirable. The activities and risks involved in 
each financial sector are very different and require different 
types of supervision. Also, the specialization trend associated 
with the evolution of the Internet—in contrast with the 
developments associated with globalization and 
conglomeration—will call for product-specific regulation. 
Clearly, given the market developments under way, the role of 
the European Central Bank, the European community, and the 
national authorities will require further consideration. In this 
respect, I very much welcome the initiative of the so-called 
“Eurogroup,” chaired by former economics minister of France 
Alphandéry, to begin a wide-ranging reassessment of the 
supervisory infrastructure in Europe.
Nevertheless, in my view, pan-European centralization of 
supervision in line with the British model of the Financial 
Services Authority is not a solution. The imbalance between the 
structure of supervision and the structure of the financial 
sector would still exist if the current supervisory bodies were 
combined into one organization. The new organization would 
be a giant, conducting bureaucratic and unfocused practices 
that would prove to be slow and ineffective in reducing 
systemic risks. Moreover, the damaging effect of negative 
publicity would be much larger in the case of a single pan-
European supervisor, as it would undermine the status of this 
authority and affect the entire European financial services 
industry.
It is also reasonable to ask whether supervision, be it 
nationally or supranationally organized, can reduce systemic 
risk effectively. More and more financial firms that are not 
subject to supervision can cause systemic risk. Examples range 
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Capital Management to giants such as GE Capital. Supervisory 
authorities are trying to come to grips with these different types 
of entities by overseeing the institutions that supply them with 
credit, which is sometimes like killing the messenger. 
Having said that, the question remains as to how to 
structure and organize the supervision of financial services. 
Given the political sensitivities, the chances for major cross-
border changes in the near future are rather small. 
Improvements, for the time being, will have to come from 
increased cooperation among national supervisory bodies. In 
a number of cases, this will probably lead to more United 
Kingdom–like supervisory bodies—as I observed, a 
development that I do not necessarily favor. The sketchy 
information that I have received from London at the very least 
suggests a slow and sticky process of integrating the three 
supervisory bodies. 
Nevertheless, let us assume that political objections can be 
overcome and that we are asked to redesign a supervisory 
system for Europe. As such, perhaps it would be interesting to 
look at a modified Australian model. This model divides 
supervisory responsibilities between supervisory authorities 
according to their various objectives. Such a division would 
result in three authorities: one for financial stability, one for 
consumer protection, and one for market integrity. 
The supervisor responsible for financial stability would 
oversee all financial institutions that could potentially cause 
risk. It would conduct macro prudential supervision as well as 
be responsible for, or at least involved in, monetary policy. The 
authority could and probably should be organized on a 
European level. The supervisory agency responsible for 
consumer protection would regulate the remaining financial 
institutions and manage a minimal deposit insurance plan. It 
would also oversee the rules of conduct for personal integrity, 
organizational integrity, and relationship integrity—focusing 
on the relationship between financial institutions and 
consumers, particularly with regard to the delivery of infor-
mation. This agency, at least for now, could be organized on a 
local level. Finally, the supervisor responsible for market 
integrity would oversee market transparency and market 
discipline.
Could such a supervisory system function in Europe? 
I honestly do not know. Or, should I say, deep in my heart I 
know that it is a utopian way of thinking. But a fresh look at a 
situation that is becoming increasingly complicated is always 
useful. I could more realistically imagine a separation between 
regulatory and supervisory authorities in which a pan-
European regulatory body is established, while day-to-day 
supervision becomes a local responsibility and therefore is 
performed by national bodies. 
Finally, a pet issue of mine is to see the financial market 
functioning as a supervisory system, a scenario that should be 
promoted much more vigorously. Financial products and 
markets are growing so complex that it is becoming more and 
more difficult to include all of the possible risks in fixed rules, 
and hence it is becoming more and more difficult for 
supervisors to monitor these risks effectively. With the 
necessary information, the financial markets could have a 
disciplinary effect on the financial industry and could serve as 
the most efficient and effective supervisory system. Market 
transparency is the ultimate condition for market discipline 
because it requires disclosure by banks of the information 
relating to their capital structure, their risks, and the adequacy 
of their capital position as a means to control those risks. This 
issue is exactly what is addressed in the new capital adequacy 
framework proposed by the Basel Committee. Such 
transparency and disclosure, by the way, should also apply to 
supervisors.
I would like to conclude by reminding you of the redesign 
of the 1988 Capital Accord. I know that it does not pertain to 
an infrastructural redesign of the supervisory system, and it 
should not. But let us not forget that the original Accord led to 
a fundamental rethinking of banking supervision in the 1980s 
and 1990s. I am convinced that the new Accord will help set the 
stage for a rethinking of financial supervision in the early part 
of the new century.
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